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Abstract: How well are industrialized nations doing in terms of their energy security?  
Without a standardized set of metrics, it is difficult to determine the extent that countries are 
properly responding to the emerging energy security challenges related to climate change, 
growing dependence on fossil fuels, population growth and economic development. In 
response, we propose the creation of an Energy Security Index to inform policymakers, 
investors and analysts about the status of energy conditions.  Using the United States and 21 
other member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) as an example, and looking at energy security from 1970 to 2007, our index shows 
that only four countries—Belgium, Denmark, Japan, and the United Kingdom—have made 
progress on multiple dimensions of the energy security problem.  The remaining 18 have 
either made no improvement or are less secure.  To make this argument, the first section of 
the article surveys the scholarly literature on energy security from 2003 to 2008 and argues 
that an index should address accessibility, affordability, efficiency, and environmental 
stewardship.  Because each of these four components is multidimensional, the second section 
discusses ten metrics that comprise an Energy Security Index: oil import dependence, 
percentage of alternative transport fuels, on-road fuel economy for passenger vehicles, energy 
intensity, natural gas import dependence, electricity prices, gasoline prices, sulfur dioxide 
emissions, and carbon dioxide emissions.  The third section analyzes the relative performance 
of four countries: Denmark (the top performer), Japan (which performed well), the United 
States (which performed poorly), and Spain (the worst performer).  The article concludes by 
offering implications for policy. Conflicts between energy security criteria mean that 
advancement along any one dimension can undermine progress on another dimension. By 
focusing on a 10-point index, public policy can better illuminate such tradeoffs and can 
identify compensating policies. 
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Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An International Perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
On January 23, 1980, President Jimmy Carter issued a famous declaration that any 
effort by a hostile power to block the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf would be viewed by 
an assault on the “vital interests” of the United States, and would be repelled by “any means 
necessary, including military force.”1  In addition to proposing to Congress that the country 
establish an Energy Security Corporation to invest in alternative sources of fuel,2 President 
Carter also created a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to perform the function of 
protecting the shipping lanes through which Middle Eastern oil flowed to American shores.  
In a policy later strengthened by the creation of the U.S. Central Command in the early 1980s 
and since termed the “Carter Doctrine,” the Ronald Reagan, George H. Bush, Bill Clinton, 
and George W. Bush Administrations have each relied on the threat of military force to deter 
and prevent major disruption in world oil supply.3  The price of these military activities in the 
Persian Gulf is expected to cost between $29 billion to $80 billion per year.4  Every 
Presidential Administration since Carter, in other words, has viewed national security and 
energy supply as inexorably intertwined. 
The deepening of the Carter Doctrine, however, does not inform us if such an 
approach to “energy security” is optimal and desirable.  Nor does it tell us which countries 
have done the best at improving their energy security since the 1970s.  This article measures 
and assesses energy security for 22 countries from 1970 to 2007.  The first section surveys 
the scholarly literature on energy security from 2003 to 2008 and argues that it should be 
composed of accessibility, affordability, efficiency, and environmental stewardship.  Because 
each of these four components is multidimensional, the second section discusses ten metrics 
that comprise an Energy Security Index. We then use our Energy Security Index to measure 
and track progress on energy security between the United States and 21 OECD countries.  
The third section analyzes the relative performance of four countries: Denmark (the top 
performer), Japan (which performed well), the United States (which performed poorly), and 
Spain (the worst performer).  The article concludes by offering implications for policy. 
In attempting to tackle a concept as complicated as energy security, we could have 
focused on almost any scale and any group of countries.  Instead of emphasizing smaller 
scales (such as the individual and enterprises) or international organizations (such as the 
World Bank or Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), we have focused exclusively 
on nation states.  And instead of looking at countries in a single region such as the European 
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Union5, Asia6, the Caspian Sea,7 or the Black Sea,8 we have investigated energy security for 
22 geographically dispersed countries that belong to the OECD. The first reason for this 
focus is practical: data on patterns of energy production and use have been collected and 
compiled for OECD countries since the 1950s, and these countries are powerful members of 
a number of multilateral organizations dealing with energy issues such as the United Nations 
and the International Energy Agency.  The next reason is more theoretical: OECD countries 
offer a representative sample of different types of energy markets and cultures.  The United 
Kingdom and New Zealand are examples of liberalized and privatized energy markets while 
other countries such as Denmark and parts of the United States remain highly regulated. The 
OECD countries we selected also include cultures as diverse as Australia, Greece, Japan, and 
Turkey.  The final reason is pragmatic: because OECD countries are the most industrialized, 
they also possess the technical and financial capacity to implement policy changes that can 
improve their energy security.  The OECD countries include many of the world’s largest 
consumers of energy, so their decisions affect the global energy marketplace 
The importance of such an exploration is threefold.  First, energy security is arguably 
one of the most important forms of human security.  Energy services are a ubiquitous 
component of modern lifestyles, needed to power modes of transport, light factories and 
workplaces, cultivate food, manufacture and distribute products, and cool and warm 
residences.  Economist E. F. Schumacher once noted that energy services in modern society 
are “not just another commodity, but the precondition of all commodities, a basic factor equal 
with air, water, and earth.”  They are used directly and indirectly by every living person, 
which means assessing how securely they are provided is crucial.     
Second, perhaps because of its ubiquity, notions of energy security are either so 
narrow that they tell us little about comprehensive energy challenges, or so broad that they 
lack precision and coherence.  Trying to measure energy security by using contemporary 
methods in isolation—such as energy intensity or electricity consumption—is akin to trying 
to drive a car with only a fuel gauge, or to seeing a doctor who only checks your cholesterol.  
Our study provides precision, breadth, and standardization to the oft-ambiguous concept. 
Without such criteria, it is difficult to determine the extent that policy decisions, private 
investments, new technologies, and research and development are keeping pace with the 
challenges facing the growing global economy in a carbon-constrained world.  Though 
considerable effort has been dedicated by energy and environmental groups to the 
development of composite indicators of transportation productivity and environmental 
quality, there are no standard composite metrics to evaluate energy security. Thus, the 
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enduring question—“Are our energy systems progressing or regressing?”—remains difficult 
to answer. 
Third, international comparisons of energy security highlight the interdependence of 
countries, enmeshed in  larger relationships between and within producers and consumers.  
Global trade in energy fuels and services amounted to $900 billion in 2006, and almost two-
thirds of the oil produced in 2007 was traded on the global market.9  Of hundreds of countries 
in the world, none are truly energy independent.  Saudi Arabia exports crude oil but must 
import refined gasoline.  Russia exports natural gas but must import uranium.  The United 
States exports coal but imports oil and natural gas.  This interdependence explains why our 
assessment of energy security examines the interactions between countries as much as within 
them, and serves as a useful reminder that energy security does not stand abstractly by itself; 
rather, it is most meaningful in a geographic context.      
2. Conceptualizing Energy Security 
Notions of energy security frequently differ by personal and institutional perspectives; 
national styles, geology, and geography; and time.  Scientists and engineers characterize 
energy security as a function of strong energy research and development, innovation, and 
technology transfer systems.10  The World Bank, in contrast, tells us that energy security is 
based on the three pillars of energy efficiency, diversification of supply, and minimization of 
price volatility.11  Consumer advocates and users tend to view energy security as reasonably 
priced energy services without disruption. Major oil and gas producers focus on the 
“security” of their access to new reserves, while electric utility companies emphasize the 
integrity of the electricity grid. Finally, politicians dwell on securing energy resources and 
infrastructure from terrorism and war.12 
Distinct national styles, geology, and geography also influence conceptions of energy 
security.  In the United States, energy security has generally meant the availability of 
sufficient supplies at affordable prices, protecting Middle East suppliers and shipping lanes 
against piracy, maintaining a strategic petroleum reserve, and reducing physical threats to 
energy infrastructure.13 Russia appears to pursue an energy security strategy of asserting state 
influence over strategic resources to gain primary control over the infrastructure through 
which it ships its hydrocarbons to international markets. Restricting foreign investment in 
domestic oil and gas fields is an important element of this strategy.14  In the United Kingdom, 
energy security tends to be associated with promoting open and competitive energy markets 
which will provide fair access to energy supplies, foster investment, and deliver diverse and 
reliable supplies at competitive prices.15  China has viewed energy security as an ability to 
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rapidly adjust to their new dependence on global markets and engage in energy diplomacy, 
shifting from their former commitments to self-reliance and sufficiency (“zili gensheng”) to a 
new desire to build a well-off society (“Xiaokang Shehui”). Buying stakes in foreign oil 
fields, militarily protecting vulnerable shipping lanes, and an all-out “energy scramble” for 
resources are key features of China’s current approach to energy security.16  Japan envisions 
energy security as offsetting its stark scarcity of domestic resources through diversification, 
trade, and investment, as well as selective engagement with neighboring Asian countries to 
jointly develop energy resources.17  Saudi Arabia pursues energy security as maintaining a 
“security of demand” for their oil and gas exports,18 while Australia cultivates a strong 
demand for uranium, natural gas, and coal exports.19 Venezuela and Columbia, in contrast, 
focus on minimizing attacks on oil, gas, and electric infrastructure.20 
Further complicating matters, conceptions of energy security change over time.  The 
modern notion of energy security emerged in the early nineteenth century as the 
mechanization of warfare accelerated the energy requirements for coal-powered warships and 
vehicles.  Global concerns about energy security became more prominent during the World 
Wars, the energy crises of the 1970s, and both invasions of Iraq.21  In the United States, 
depending on the Administration, energy security has meant ending all oil imports, 
eliminating imports only from the Middle East, merely reducing dependence on foreign 
imports, and entirely weaning the country off oil.22  Following the emergence of nuclear 
power in the 1970s, energy security has been expanded to include nuclear nonproliferation. 
None of this, however, tells us which institutional, national, or temporal form of 
energy security is preferable.  Current conceptions of energy security, moreover, are so vague 
that it would be simultaneously possible to increase oil production to strengthen energy 
availability while weakening environmental stewardship, as is the case with the development 
of tar sands and oil shale. Such contradictions and tensions among the various national 
approaches and meanings of energy security, and their differentiation over time, reveals 
important dimensions to the concept, but they do not address the deeper question as to which 
is the preferred or most beneficial form.  We argue, based on an extensive assessment of 91 
peer-reviewed academic articles on energy security from September, 2003 to September, 
2008,23 that energy security should be based on the interconnected factors of availability, 
affordability, efficiency, and environmental stewardship.24     
2.1 Energy Security as Availability 
The classic conception of energy security addresses the relative safety and source 
diversification of energy fuels and services.25  More than 80 percent of the academic 
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literature we examined noted the importance of availability, a component often predicated on 
promoting independence and diversification.   
Part of ensuring availability entails procuring “sufficient and uninterrupted supply” 
and minimizing foreign dependence on fuels.26  Dependence can be costly, most recently 
illustrated with Russian efforts to negotiate natural gas prices in Europe.  Russia was able to 
successfully triple the price of natural gas exported to Belarus and Ukraine because these 
countries were completely dependent on Russian supply. In more serious cases, growing 
dependence or perceived scarcity of domestic energy supply has precipitated international 
conflict.  Energy supplies had a significant role to play in provoking the American 
Revolutionary War.27  In World War I, both Entente and Central powers believed control of 
coal, oil, and gas resources were a key to victory.28  During World War II, Japan, suffering 
from a dearth of available raw materials, invaded Manchuria in 1931 to acquire their coal 
reserves.29  In response to Japan’s later invasion of China in 1937, the U.S. cut off oil exports 
in July 1941.  Without domestic resources, Japan invaded the oil-rich Indonesian islands, and 
the resulting tensions were a direct contributor to the Japanese decision to attack Pearl 
Harbor.  That same year, Adolf Hitler declared war on the Soviet Union in part to secure oil 
for his war machine, and he launched Operation Blau to protect German oilfields in Romania 
while securing new ones in the Central Caucuses.  The Soviet Union attempted to invade 
northern Iran in 1945 and 1946 to acquire control of their oil resources precisely to reduce 
their own dependence.30  During the Gulf War of 1990-1991, Iraq invaded Kuwait explicitly 
to enhance its control of energy reserves.  Lessening dependence on foreign supplies of 
energy fuels, therefore, is an important component of ensuring availability and improving 
energy security. 
A related aspect of availability is diversification, or preventing the sabotage and 
attack of critical infrastructure, such as power plants, pipelines, dams, and transmission and 
distribution networks so that the services they provide are uninteruptible.  Diversification 
encompasses three dimensions:  (1) Source diversification requires utilizing a mix of different 
energy sources, fuels, types, fuel cycles (i.e., relying not just on nuclear power or natural gas 
but also coal, oil, wind, biomass, geothermal, etc.);  (2) Supplier diversification refers to 
developing multiple points of energy production so that no single company or provider has 
control over the market (i.e., purchasing oil from not just one or two companies but a 
diversified mix of dozens of energy firms); and (3) Spatial diversification means dispersing 
the locations of individual facilities so that they cannot be disrupted by a single attack, event, 
malfunction, or failure (i.e., building one oil refinery in every state instead of placing all of 
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them in the Gulf Coast).  The principle of diversification is rooted in ecology (natural 
ecosystems reveal that a diversity of flora and fauna are best able to prevent spread of disease 
and pests);31 finance (a diversified investment strategy is the best way to guarantee highest 
overall return);32 and politics (democracy can be viewed as a form of diversification of the 
idea of consensus building, decision-making, and accountability in governance).33   
Multiplying one’s supply sources by investing in multiple alternatives serves the 
interests both of consumers and producers because it ensures that the energy supply chain is 
not dependent on any single fuel source.  As well, the geographical dispersion of energy 
facilities not only improves their overall reliability, it makes the entire distribution network 
more secure and resilient to accidental disruption, systems failure, or intentional attack.   
Geographical dispersion creates multiple targets, all of which would have to be disrupted at 
the same time to elicit total systems collapse.   
Diversification, too, has historical importance, for a variety of actors, saboteurs, 
terrorists, and insurgents have targeted energy infrastructure.  Starting with North America, in 
1975 the New World Liberation Front bombed pipelines of the Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company in California more than 10 times, and members of the Ku Klux Klan and San 
Joaquin Militia have been convicted of attempting to attack natural gas infrastructure 
throughout Mexico and the United States.34  In 1997 in Texas, police prevented the bombing 
of natural gas storage tanks at a processing plant by Ku Klux Klan members seeking to create 
a diversion for a robbery.35  In 1999 Vancouver police arrested a man for planning to blow up 
the trans-Alaskan pipeline for personal profit in oil futures.36  In 2001, an attack on the trans-
Alaska pipeline with a high-powered rifle forced a two day shut down and caused extensive 
economic and environmental damage—all apparently part of a hunting trip gone awry.37   
Focusing beyond North America, in the 1970s during the Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen conducted so many attacks on Soviet oil and gas pipelines that 
the Russians lost more than 500 tons of petroleum every day.  A few decades later in the 
midst of the Russian-Chechen conflict, both sides exploited pipelines as a way to intensify 
their military campaign, with the Chechens even tapping the Baku-Grozny-Novorossiysk 
pipeline more than 100 times to draw away oil to hidden refineries where it could be 
processed into cheap gasoline then sold in Grozny to purchase weapons.38  The government 
of Saudi Arabia, which manages more than 11,000 miles of gas and oil pipelines, has repelled 
at least thirty attempts in the past four years to destroy or damage their pipelines by 
“insurgents” in nearby Iraq.39  Next door, in Iraq, more than 150 attacks on the country’s 
4,000 mile pipeline system occurred over the course of 12 months.40  Suicide bombers have 
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attacked natural gas infrastructure in Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Yemen,41 and in Pakistan, 
gunmen have frequently stormed Pakistan Petroleum Limited natural gas facilities, fired 
rockets at pipelines, and kidnapped employees of the Water and Power Development 
Authority.42  In Columbia, the 480-mile Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline has had so many 
holes blown in it that the locals jokingly refer to it as “the flute.”43  In the Sudan, Arakis 
Energy Corporation and Greater Nile Petroleum Company sometimes have to repel daily 
attacks on their oil and gas pipelines.44  London Police also foiled a plot by the Irish 
Republican Army in 1996 to bomb gas pipelines and other utilities across the city with 36 
explosive devices.45  There is much precedence, in other words, for diversification becoming 
a more significant component of energy security.       
 
2.2 Energy Security as Affordability 
 A second component of energy security extends beyond availability to include the 
basic affordability of energy services.  Slightly more than 50 percent of the examined 
literature suggested affordability as an important principle.  Less affluent families spend a 
larger proportion of their income on energy services (some as much as 40 percent), so 
ensuring that energy is affordable can be central to meeting their basic needs.  Moreover, 
people living in poverty pay proportionally more for energy, hindering accumulate of the 
wealth needed to make investments to escape their poverty.  The United Nations has warned 
that energy pollution has an often ignored class dimension: infant mortality rates are more 
than 5 times higher among the poor, the proportion of children below the age of five who are 
malnourished is 8 times higher, and maternal mortality rates are 14 times higher.46  Indirectly, 
higher energy prices tend to inflate the price of almost all other goods and services, since 
energy can account for up to 15 percent of the total cost for food processing, textiles, lumber, 
paper processing, chemical manufacturing, and cement mixing.47 
 Energy fuels and services must not only be affordable, their prices should also be 
relatively stable.  When energy prices swing wildly, suppliers find it difficult to plan prudent 
investments. The enormous price spikes for natural gas seen over the past few years in the 
United States, for example, have made natural gas–fired plants uneconomic to operate, and 
have resulted in significant increases in electricity prices in several areas, much to the 
consternation of utility executives.48  At the same time, the energy affordability component of 
energy security can conflict with other energy security criteria. For instance, energy price 
controls in developing countries have resulted in artificially low prices, which thwart 
investments in energy-efficient and clean energy technologies. 
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2.3 Energy Security as Energy and Economic Efficiency 
 A third component, mentioned by about one-third of the literature, relates to energy 
efficiency, or the improved performance and increased deployment of more efficient 
equipment and conservation.49  Energy efficiency enables the most economically efficient use 
of energy to perform a certain task (such as light, torque, or heat) by minimizing unit of 
resources per unit of output.  Energy efficiency can include substituting resource inputs or 
fuels, changing habits and preferences, or altering the mix of goods and services to demand 
less energy.50  A key part of improving the efficiency of energy technologies and services 
relates to innovation and research and development.  Energy technology innovation is the 
process of leading to new or improved energy technologies that enhance the quality of energy 
services and reduce the negative externalities and costs associated with energy supply and 
use.51   
 
2.4 Energy Security as Environmental Stewardship  
 The final component, promoted by about one-fourth of the examined articles, relates 
to environmental stewardship, and it emphasizes the importance of sustainability. In its 
classic sense, the concept encompasses the notion of balancing current resource consumption 
with the resource requirements of future generations. For example, the landmark 1987 
Brundtland Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (published 
under the title Our Common Future) defined sustainable development as meeting “the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.” 52  When applied to energy policy, sustainability has meant pursuing one of three 
rules: ensuring that the harvest rates of renewable resources do not exceed regeneration rates; 
making sure that waste emissions do not exceed relevant assimilative capacities of 
ecosystems; and guaranteeing that non-renewable resources are only depleted at a rate equal 
to the creation of renewable ones.   Even groups such as the International Energy Agency53 
and former American Defense Secretaries John Deutch and James Schlesinger54 have noted 
that mitigating and adapting to climate change must be considered a part of any attempt to 
create energy security  
 
2.5 All Together Now 
 These four criteria—availability, affordability, efficiency, and stewardship—must be 
promoted holistically.55  A number of examples illustrate the necessity of needing all four 
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criteria simultaneously.  Protecting the shipping lanes used by oil tankers with military force 
protects supply, meeting the criterion of availability, but diverts attention and resources from 
pursuing alternatives to petroleum, failing to meet the criterion of stewardship.56  Increasing 
production of corn-based ethanol would reduce petroleum dependence in the transport sector, 
but would mitigate environmental stewardship through the widespread use of fertilizers and 
destructive farming practices.57   Stockpiling petroleum and natural gas through strategic 
reserves can serve as a buffer against price shocks, but also offer just the kind of centralized 
targets that terrorists and saboteurs find attractive.58   
Unfortunately, many countries continue to adhere to particularly narrow views of 
energy security, pursuing one of the four criteria even at the expense of each of the other 
three.  A study of large-scale energy projects in Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos found that 
while the construction of regional interstate natural gas pipelines and hydroelectric projects 
enhanced the availability of energy supply, such projects have exacerbated social tension, 
worsened the gap between rich and poor, hastened environmental degradation, and intensified 
various manifestations of human insecurity, ultimately making electricity and energy more 
expensive.59  International funding by the European Union on coal-to-liquids has helped 
some countries reduce dependence on foreign sources of oil, but this strategy conflicts with 
efforts to fight climate change.60  The United States has started shifting from the use of coal 
to natural gas in the power sector to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but this has 
exacerbated dependence on foreign sources of liquefied natural gas.61  Figure 1 illustrates 
some of the many conflicts between components of energy security. Tradeoffs often occur 
between options that are effective along one dimension, but which adversely impact other 
aspects of security. Given the abundant illustrations of such conflicts, it would appear that 
most countries have overtly or inadvertently pursued technologies and policies that involve 
swapping progress in one energy security domain with retreat in another. 
 
Competing Dimensions of Energy Security 13 
Figure 1: Conflicts Between Components of Energy Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Quantifying Energy Security and Evaluating Performance 
These examples, and the countless more that we have not mentioned, underscore the 
importance of pursuing a comprehensive notion of energy security, one that does not achieve 
secure supply and affordable prices at the expense of stewardship and efficiency, or vice 
versa. Recognizing that each criterion does not exist in a vacuum, and that each is of 
comparable importance, we have developed 10 metrics that comprise an Energy Security 
Index. (See Table 1). 
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Table 1: Defining and Measuring Energy Security 
 
Criteria  Underlying Values 
 
Explanation  
 
Metrics 
Availability 
 
Independence, 
diversification, 
reliability 
 
Diversifying the fuels used to 
provide energy services as well 
as the location of facilities using 
those fuels, promoting energy 
systems that can recover 
quickly from attack or 
disruption, and minimizing 
dependence on foreign suppliers 
 
Oil import 
dependence; 
Natural gas 
import 
dependence; 
Availability of 
alternative fuels 
Affordability Equity   Providing energy services that 
are affordable for consumers 
and minimizing price volatility   
 
Retail electricity 
prices; Retail 
gasoline/petrol 
prices 
 
Energy and Economic Efficiency  
 
Innovation,  
resource 
custodianship, 
minimization of 
waste 
Improving the performance of 
energy equipment and altering 
consumer attitudes  
 
Energy intensity; 
Per capita 
electricity use; 
Average fuel 
economy for 
passenger 
vehicles 
 
Environmental Stewardship  Sustainability  Protecting the natural 
environment and future 
generations 
 
Sulfur dioxide 
emissions; 
Carbon dioxide 
emissions  
 
To reflect availability, oil import dependence, natural gas import dependence, and 
availability of alternative fuels serve as useful indicators.  Oil import dependence and natural 
gas import dependence reflect how dependent a country is on foreign supplies of petroleum 
(mostly used in transport) and natural gas (a feedstock for industrial activity and power 
generation), and also document changes in the supply mix for the world’s first and third most 
used fuels (the second being coal).  The presence of alternative fuels such as ethanol and bio-
diesel also reveal how far countries have moved away from dependence on petroleum.  To 
reflect affordability, the price of electricity and gasoline at the retail level serve as important 
metrics.   We have decided to track residential prices for electricity and gasoline consumption 
rather than diesel or jet fuel because homes and passenger vehicles account for a majority of 
the energy used by ordinary people.62  To reflect energy and economic efficiency, metrics 
such as energy intensity, per capita electricity use, and fuel economy show different but 
important dimensions.  Perhaps the most important of these three is energy intensity, a 
measure that indicates the amount of energy used to produce a unit of GDP.  By correlating 
energy use with economic output, the measure thus encompasses patterns of consumption and 
use for industries, government facilities, consumers, and multiple sectors all at once.  Per 
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capita electricity consumption and on-road fuel economy for passenger vehicles also show 
how efficient individual technologies have become at the end-user level.  To reflect 
environmental stewardship, aggregate sulfur dioxide emissions and carbon dioxide emissions 
reveal how far countries have gone towards mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, acid rain, 
and noxious air pollution.  These indicators also help show relative progress in how 
governments have implemented national climate change programs. 
 We collected data on these ten indicators and metrics for 22 OECD countries from 
1970 to 2007, with a few exceptions and caveats.  First, reliable data for energy intensity was 
only available for 1980 and 2005; fuel economy data for 2005 instead of 2007; and sulfur 
dioxide emissions data for 2000 instead of 2007.  Second, our index is not meant to imply 
that quantitative measures of energy security are perfect, or that reducing complex situations 
to numbers is without problems. Numerical indices often highlight not what is most 
significant or meaningful, but merely what is measurable. Quantitative measurements, 
especially those taken out of context, can also conceal important nuances and variability.  
Does a reduction in the energy intensity of a given country mean that its economy is 
becoming more energy efficient, or that instead more energy-intense products are being 
imported from elsewhere and energy-intensive jobs outsourced?63  Third, collecting the data 
for this study was tedious and difficult.  Most of it was not available online and the data for 
1970 involved much digging through libraries.  Historical data from International Energy 
Agency publications and archives are inconsistent, and discrepancies found in data and 
reports published by different agencies (e.g., the Energy Information Administration, World 
Resources Institute, United Nations, and the World Bank) are even more difficult and 
troubling.   
 That said, we do believe that these ten metrics still provide a reasonable sense for how 
well countries have provided energy services and promoted energy security, and the results 
may be surprising to some.  Tables 2 and 3 show the data for each of the 10 metrics for the 22 
selected countries in 1970 and 2007.  We then assessed the relative progress for each country 
for each metric, assigning a value of -1 if the metric worsened over time; 0 if it stayed the 
same; and +1 if it improved.  All metrics were weighed equally, with the results presented in 
Table 4 and Figure 2.       
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Table 2: Energy Security Performance Index for 22 OECD Countries, 1970 (in $2007)64 
 
 Oil import 
dependence (%) 
 
Alternative 
fuels (%) 
On-road 
fuel 
economy 
(passenger 
vehicles 
mpg-e)  
 
Energy intensity 
(thousand 
BTU/US$GDP)* 
Electricity 
use 
(kWh/capita) 
Natural gas 
import 
dependence 
(%) 
Nominal 
electricity 
retail 
prices 
(US¢/kWh) 
Nominal 
gasoline 
prices 
(US$/liter) 
SO2 
emissions 
(million 
tons) 
CO2 
emissions 
(million 
tons) 
 
Australia 67% 3.9% 17 10.3 3,919 0% 3.7 0.26 1.6 143 
Austria 57% 5.7% 21 8.5 3,302 34% 18 1.32 0.4 49 
Belgium 100% 1.6% 22 12.2 3,399 99% 18.5 1.74 1.2 118 
Canada  46% 2.7% 14 18.7 9,529 1% 3.7 0.37 4.1 340 
Denmark 99% 1.9% 24 8.8 3,211 0% 9.5 0.42 0.3 56 
Finland 100% 2.3% 22 12.6 4,885 100% 5.3 0.53 0.4 40 
France 98% 3.7% 28 8.7 2,882 35% 7.9 0.74 3.5 435 
Germany 92% 3.6% 24 9.8 2,962 24% 15.9 1.16 6.9 984 
Greece 99% 1.7% 21 6.0 1,118 0% 2.1 0.58 0.3 25 
Ireland 98% 2.8% 22 9.0 1,956 0% 6.9 0.58 0.2 22 
Italy 97% 1.3% 28 7.1 2,262 0% 6.3 0.42 2.6 295 
Japan 100% 1.8% 20 7.8 3,445 32% 48.6 1.27 5.1 743 
Netherlands 97% 2.0% 25 12.9 3,110 0% 15.3 1.00 1.4 130 
New Zealand 100% 4.4% 19 11.0 4,941 0% 3.17 0.48 0.1 14 
Norway 100% 2.5% 23 16.4 14,785 0% 2.6 0.42 0.2 24 
Portugal 99% 2.0% 23 4.4 830 0% 20.6 1.59 0.1 15 
Spain 99% 2.7% 27 7.0 1,623 85% 5.8 0.37 1.1 121 
Sweden 100% 2.5% 20 13.7 8,048 0% 3.2 0.32 0.9 831 
Switzerland 100% 3.1% 23 7.6 4,693 100% 4.0 1.59 0.1 39 
Turkey 53% 2.3% 15 5.0 241 0% 21.1 0.11 0.8 42 
UK 100% 2.3% 21 9.9 4,489 7% 5.3 0.58 8.6 630 
United States 22% 4.9% 13 14.7 8,022 4% 7.0 0.42 31.2 4,200 
Median 99% 2.5% 22 9.0 3,302 1% 6.9 0.6 0.9 118 
Mean 84% 2.6% 21 9.6 4,079 24% 10.5 0.7 3.2 416 
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Table 3: Energy Security Performance Index for 22 OECD Countries, 200765 
 
 Oil import 
dependence (%) 
 
Alternative 
fuels (%) 
On-road 
fuel 
economy 
(passenger 
vehicles 
mpg-e)  
Energy intensity 
(thousand 
BTU/US$GDP)* 
Electricity 
use 
(kWh/capita) 
Natural gas 
import 
dependence 
(%) 
Real 
electricity 
retail 
prices 
(US¢/kWh) 
Real 
gasoline 
prices 
($/liter) 
SO2 
emissions 
(million 
tons)* 
CO2 
emissions 
(million 
tons) 
 
Australia 37% 1.7% 26 9.0 11,309 0% 12.5 1.24 2.6 395 
Austria 91% 3.7% 31 7.0 8,090 95% 22.6 1.81 0.2 73 
Belgium 99% 1.9% 29 9.2 8,688 100% 16.5 2.20 1.3 117 
Canada  0% 1.2% 23 13.8 16,766 0% 7.6 1.08 2.9 539 
Denmark 0% 2.3% 30 5.2 6,864 0% 38.2 2.05 0.1 55 
Finland 96% 1.9% 29 8.8 17,178 93% 17.1 2.12 0.3 67 
France 96% 1.9% 32 7.2 7,585 97% 17.3 2.03 1.3 378 
Germany 94% 1.9% 29 7.0 7,175 79% 23.1 2.10 2.4 823 
Greece 99% 1.9% 29 6.8 5,372 99% 13.0 1.19 0.8 94 
Ireland 100% 1.9% 29 4.9 6,500 86% 24.7 1.77 0.1 45 
Italy 93% 2.5% 33 5.8 5,762 85% 27.2 2.06 1.5 448 
Japan 97% 1.8% 22 6.5 8,220 93% 17.8 1.46 2.6 1,213 
Netherlands 91% 1.9% 30 9.8 7,057 59% 24.2 2.28 1.0 178 
New Zealand 69% 2.9% 29 9.1 9,746 0% 17.8 1.35 0.1 37 
Norway 0% 1.9% 29 12.8 24,295 0% 17.5 2.32 0.6 37 
Portugal 98% 1.9% 29 5.9 4,799 100% 23.3 2.07 0.2 56 
Spain 98% 1.9% 31 7.1 6,213 100% 18.7 1.64 2.1 328 
Sweden 99% 1.9% 28 9.1 15,230 100% 12.7 1.99 0.3 48 
Switzerland 99% 1.9% 29 5.8 8,279 100% 15.6 1.65 0.1 44 
Turkey 94% 3.7% 29 6.1 2,053 97% 15.8 2.60 2.1 240 
UK 4% 3.7% 31 6.0 6,192 8% 22.7 2.07 1.6 536 
United States 59% 2.9% 20 9.1 13,515 17% 10.3 0.82 17.8 5,697 
Median 94% 1.9% 29 7.0 7,585 93% 17.8 2.0 1.0 117 
Mean 72% 2.2% 27 7.4 8,890 64% 18.4 1.8 1.8 502 
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Table 4: Energy Security Performance Score, 1970 to 2007 
 
 
 Oil import 
dependence 
(%) 
 
Alternative 
fuels (%) 
Fuel 
economy 
(new 
passenger 
vehicles 
mpg-e) 
  
Energy intensity 
(thousand 
BTU/US$GDP)* 
Electricity 
use 
(kWh/capita) 
Natural gas 
import 
dependence 
(%) 
Nominal 
electricity 
retail 
prices 
(US¢/kWh) 
Nominal 
gasoline 
prices 
(US$/liter) 
SO2 
emissions 
(million 
tons) 
CO2 
emissions 
(million 
tons) 
 
Final 
Score 
Australia +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -3 
Austria -1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -4 
Belgium +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 +1 +2 
Canada  +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 0 
Denmark +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 0 -1 -1 +1 +1 +3 
Finland +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 0 
France +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 0 
Germany -1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1  -1 +1 +1 -2 
Greece 0 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -5 
Ireland -1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -4 
Italy +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -1 0 
Japan +1 0 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 +1 -1 +1 
Netherlands +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -2 
New Zealand +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 0 -1 -1 0 -1 -2 
Norway +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -3 
Portugal +1 -1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -6 
Spain +1 -1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -6 
Sweden +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 0 
Switzerland +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 0 -1 -1 0 -1 -2 
Turkey -1 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -2 
UK +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 2 
United States -1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -4 
Mean 0.5 -0.4 1.0 0.7 -1.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.0 0.3 -0.5 -1.7 
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Figure 2: Most to Least Improved Energy Security Rankings, Based on 1970-2007 Trends 
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The results of our survey show that Denmark, Belgium, and the United Kingdom 
scored the highest; Japan, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden did relatively well; 
Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, Turkey, Australia, Norway, Austria, 
Ireland, and the United States did poorly; and Greece, Portugal, and Spain did the worst.  A 
few interesting trends are worth pointing out.  First, scores are highly variable within the 
OECD, implying that the countries examined have taken diverse and divergent paths towards 
energy policy and security, and also reflecting different natural resource endowments.  
Second, no country scored perfectly, meaning that none improved in all categories.  
Denmark, with the best score, led the pack with “3” when their highest possible score was 
“10.”  Third, a majority of countries did poorly, with thirteen countries scoring below zero, 
implying that their energy security has worsened from 1970 to 2007.  Fourth, some metrics, 
such as energy intensity and fuel economy for passenger vehicles, have almost universally 
improved, while others, such as electricity consumption per capita, electricity prices, and 
gasoline prices have almost universally deteriorated.   
Using the same statistical data, supplemented by a review of the published literature, 
we explore four countries in greater detail, focusing on their energy security scores and the 
strategic actions that have led to them. The four countries—Denmark, Japan, the United 
States, and Spain—represent two of the best and two of the worst countries in terms of  their 
energy security trends over time (See Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Energy Security Progress for Denmark, Japan, United States, and Spain, 1970 to 2007* 
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*Grey lines represent worsening trends.
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3.1 Denmark  
 Denmark has exhibited considerable success in improving its energy security 
compared to the other countries analyzed.  Since 1970, Denmark has transitioned from being 
99 percent dependent on foreign energy sources such as oil and coal to becoming a net 
exporter of natural gas, oil and electricity today. Over the same period, Denmark has 
improved its reliance on non-petroleum transportation fuel, decreased its energy intensity by 
almost a factor of two, and lowered its aggregate carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide 
emissions.  The only areas where Denmark did not improve were in electricity use per capita, 
electricity prices, and gasoline prices, and these latter three were areas where almost no 
country improved.   
 Denmark is now the unchallenged world leader in terms of wind energy, exporting $8 
billion in wind turbine technology and equipment per year, and Denmark also boasts the 
lowest energy consumption per capita in the European Union. 66   Primary energy 
consumption nationally grew just 4 percent from 1980 to 2004, even though the economy 
grew more than 64 percent in fixed prices. At the same time, more renewable energy replaced 
fossil fuels, and total CO2 emissions decreased by 16 percent. Therefore, the carbon dioxide 
emission intensity—the amount of CO2 emitted per unit of Gross Domestic Product—was 48 
percent lower in 2004 than it was in 1980.   
The most obvious factor responsible for such improvement is strong political 
leadership and well-designed, consistent policy mechanisms aimed at improving energy 
efficiency and promoting renewable energy.  Denmark implemented energy taxes in 1974 as 
a response to the energy crises, and used the billions in dollars of revenue to invest in wind 
power, biomass, and small-scale combined heat and power units.  The taxes furthermore sent 
price signals that encouraged voluntary energy efficiency measures.  Denmark mandated 
energy efficiency standards for new buildings, and tightened them over a period of 30 years.  
Danish regulators also designed investment subsidies and feed-in tariffs forcing utilities to 
buy all power produced from renewable energy technologies at a rate equal to 70 to 85 
percent the consumer retail price of electricity in a given distribution area, and they later 
regulated that all renewable power providers be given priority access to the grid.67  The 
government levied a general carbon tax on all forms of energy and set strict vehicle fuel 
economy standards, and later adopted European standards pledging to decrease carbon 
dioxide emissions from automobiles to 140 grams of carbon dioxide emitted per kilometer 
driven by 2008, which help explain Denmark’s lowered emissions of greenhouse gases.   
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While these efforts have improved many aspects of energy security, they have also 
made energy more expensive.  Denmark’s taxes do mean that electricity prices are the highest 
in the European Union at about 38 cents per kWh, and the price of petrol is more expensive 
than 13 other OECD countries.  Denmark’s experience does suggest that improving 
availability, efficiency, and stewardship can tradeoff with affordability, but overall the 
country appears to be the most energy secure in the OECD.   
 
3.2 Japan 
 A similar pattern of strong government support for energy security exists in Japan, 
although with less focus on renewable energy and some other notable differences.  Since 
1970, Japan has lessened its dependence on oil and improved vehicle fuel economy slightly, 
but increased its dependence on natural gas and significantly increased its sulfur dioxide and 
carbon dioxide emissions despite its promises under the Kyoto Protocol.  Electricity use per 
capita more than doubled and gasoline prices rose, but Japan was also one of only three 
countries where electricity prices decreased, and its energy intensity also improved.  
 Overall, Japan recorded unprecedented levels of economic growth between 1970 and 
2007, closing the gap in per capita income, raising standards of living, and improving labor 
productivity compared to Western Europe and North America all while drastically improving 
energy efficiency.68  Devastated after World War II, Japan’s immediate problem was securing 
adequate supply of energy to fuel reconstruction and industrial growth, and the country’s 
energy needs were met predominately by imported oil and domestic coal.  Population density 
in major cities such as Tokyo, however, made the mounting costs of air and water pollution 
visible, and environmental awareness was starting to rise at the same time the Arab oil 
embargo hit.  By 1973, the time of the oil crisis, petroleum accounted for nearly 80 percent of 
total energy demand, and the crisis precipitated nothing less than panic.69 
Energy security was given highest priority, and from 1973 to 1975 the government 
announced a formal energy security strategy that consisted of reducing dependence on 
petroleum, diversifying domestic energy supply, aggressively promoting energy 
conservation, and pushing research and development.  Japan’s Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) began their “Moonlight Project” in 1978 to develop more efficient 
power technologies and early fuel cells. In addition, the government offered free energy 
audits for smaller firms and issued standards for combustion and heating devices in industry 
to improve energy efficiency.  These standards applied to more than 3,500 factories in the 
manufacturing mining and energy supply sectors, and the government also required these 
Competing Dimensions of Energy Security 25 
facilities to hire a certified energy manager and to publicly disclose their energy consumption 
annually. 
The 1980s saw Japan pass an Alternative Energy Law with provisions forcing 
suppliers to adopt natural gas and renewable power sources, along with the creation of tax 
incentives and low-interest loans for industrial energy efficiency measures, emphasizing the 
petrochemicals, refining, cement, and paper industries.70  The first minimum energy 
performance standards came in 1983 for refrigerators and air conditioners, and were later 
expanded to virtually all appliances, including the underrated electric toilet seat warmer.   
The appliance standards were very successful at reducing electricity consumption. Average 
electricity use for refrigerators, for example, declined by 15 percent from 1979 to 1997 while 
average refrigerator size increased by 90 percent.  Japanese regulators also applied their 
performance standards to imported technology ranging from automobiles and televisions to 
air conditioners and computers, and demanded that the efficiency level of new products had 
to meet the best performing product in the market, in some cases requiring energy efficiency 
improvements of more than 50 percent.71 
Japanese progress, however, has been more tempered than Denmark.  Energy use per 
capita increased from 1973 to 2005 for both Japanese households and passenger travel.  
While the government promoted strict performance standards for appliances, they set only 
voluntary standards for buildings, and did not ramp up financial incentives until the late 
1990s.  Japan did require efficiency standards and efficiency labeling for automobiles, and 
these led to a 12 percent increase in fuel economy from 1979 to 1985 and another 8.5 percent 
increase from 1990 to 2000.  Such improvement, however, was offset by a doubling of 
transport energy use between 1973 and 2001 due to the growth in vehicle ownership and 
increases in vehicle size.  Private automobile travel rose in Japan from a modest 42.5 percent 
in 1970 to 55.9 percent in 1987.72  Moreover, cheap oil prices in mid-1980s encouraged 
energy consumption.  Energy demand growth as a whole averaged only 0.2 percent between 
1973 and 1986, but jumped to 4 percent between 1987 and 1991.73 
 
3.3 United States 
 The United States fared poorly compared to almost all other countries—with only 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain performing worse.  The country has improved in only three of 
the indicators from 1970 to 2007—energy intensity, fuel economy, and sulfur dioxide 
emissions. In contrast, the country has become significantly more dependent on foreign 
supplies of natural gas and oil and remains the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases.   
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While progress in the adoption of more energy-efficient technologies has saved 
billions of dollars throughout the economy, most other indicators of energy autonomy 
demonstrate that the country has become less less energy secure over time.  Even though 
energy efficiency has taken root in some sectors of the economy, it has not compensated for 
the growth in energy consumption that has occurred since 1973, nor will it (if current trends 
continue) accommodate the growth that forecasters anticipate in coming decades.  Moreover, 
America’s dependence on oil from insecure and politically unstable countries has required 
extensive diplomatic and military efforts that incur huge costs borne by energy users and 
taxpayers.  The country’s information economy also remains inextricably tied to reliable 
power and to just-in-time manufacturing and distribution processes that depend on fleets of 
petroleum-guzzling trucks and airplanes.74   
The United States remains more susceptible today to oil supply disruptions and price 
spikes than at any time in the recent past.  It has grown to become the world’s largest oil 
consumer by a considerable margin while, at the same time, its domestic oil production has 
plummeted.  Oil imports have filled the expanding gap, accounting for 59 percent of total 
U.S. oil consumption in 2007—up from 22 percent in 1970.   The United States has so many 
automobiles that the number of cars exceeds the number of people with drivers’ licenses.75    
The United States also continues to see increasing demand for electricity in a way that 
threatens its ability to meet customer load requirements.  The country consumed about 170 
percent more electricity in 2007 than it did in 1970, with power usage growing from 25 
percent of the nation’s total energy use in 1970 to 40 percent today.  Efforts resulting from 
three decades of clean air legislation have decreased sulfur dioxide emissions from electric 
generators in the United States.  Nevertheless, air pollution remains a serious threat to human 
and ecosystem health.  Americans have experienced a rise in respiratory illnesses, and 
visibility continues to degrade in formerly pristine areas as a result of pollution from vehicles 
and coal-burning power plants.  Beyond air pollution issues, current energy trends will lead to 
expanded emissions of greenhouse gases, which appear to be contributing to increased global 
temperatures, recession of glaciers, and more frequent and powerful weather events such as 
hurricanes. 
Because of its huge dependence on imported oil to fuel a transportation sector that has 
seen little improvement in energy efficiency, the nation could be ravaged by disruptions to oil 
supplies due to weather, war, or terrorist attacks.  At the same time, growing electricity 
consumption and reliance on power plants employing natural gas (which increasingly comes 
from foreign sources) make the electric utility infrastructure more vulnerable to service 
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disruptions.  And while efficiency efforts have successfully stemmed the growth rate of fuel 
consumption in the last few decades, population increases and economic expansion have 
forced up the nation’s overall use of energy, exacerbating the country’s environmental 
problems.   
 
3.4 Spain 
 Tied for last in our energy security index, Spain has shown improvement in only two 
indicators: a meager reduction in dependence on foreign sources of oil from 99 percent to 98 
percent, and a modest improvement in on-road fuel economy from 27 to 31 miles per gallon.  
Spain has worsened in every other metric, including energy intensity.  Total primary energy 
use per unit of GDP has fallen for 19 other OECD countries (two other exceptions being 
Greece and Portugal), and overall major OECD economies used a third less primary energy 
to generate a unit of GDP in 2006 than in the 1970s.76 
 Spain has defied this trend.  The country lacks sufficient supplies of domestic coal, 
oil, gas, and uranium, has experienced ongoing industrialization, but made little improvement 
in energy efficiency.  Thus, the Spanish energy sector is currently suffering from difficulty in 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions, high prices, increasing reliance on imported fuels, high 
levels of growth in energy demand, and stagnating energy efficiency and energy intensity, 
culminating in a situation even Spanish analysts consider unsustainable.77  Spain’s gradual 
transition to democracy left intact the prevailing economic structures that had existed during 
the Franco regime. Unlike the comparatively progressive governments implementing energy 
reforms in other OECD countries during the 1970s, bankers and industrial managers 
continued to play the primary role in Spanish energy policymaking.  Rather than promote 
energy efficiency or diversification, these stakeholders sought ways to ensure a smooth 
political transition, maintain economic growth, and retain their political power.  From 1975 to 
1982, alternative sources of policy such as left-wing parties, environmental groups, trade 
unions, and consumer advocates were able to exert little influence over Spanish energy 
policy.  The country thus remained committed to developing conventional forms of supply 
and strengthening agreements to import energy fuels, but neglected energy efficiency and 
alternative energy.78  When the Spanish Socialist Workers Party came to power in 1982, 
energy policy did not break significantly with past patterns.   
Whereas energy intensity declined in almost every other OECD country, the late 
1980s and most of the 1990s saw sustained growth in energy consumption per unit of GDP in 
Spain, which increased at an annual rate of 0.75 percent from 1990 to 1997.  Per capita 
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electricity consumption and carbon dioxide emissions also increased at rates between 2.3 and 
2.8 percent annually over the same period.79  Spanish regulators heavily focused on building 
nuclear plants in the early 1980s, but their plans were threatened by high costs and the 
Chernobyl disaster in 1986.  Despite a few early policy documents and royal decrees, the 
country did not seriously consider energy efficiency and conservation until the early 1990s.80  
At this time, however, a significant number of mergers and acquisitions occurred in the 
energy sector, creating massive levels of concentration.  The newly integrated energy 
companies, rather than focusing on the domestic Spanish market, initiated plans for 
international expansion, attempting to privatize and invest in emerging markets in Latin 
America.81  Spanish companies established production, refining, and manufacturing centers 
in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, and Mexico. The Spanish oil company REPSOL-YPF, the 
seventh largest in the world, expanded exploration and production to four Latin American 
countries.  Endesa and Iberdrola, some of the  world’s largest electricity companies, became 
leading power suppliers for seven countries in South America and Central America.  The 
Spanish company Gas Natural Group also became the largest single investor in Latin 
American gas markets.   
The consolidation and concentration of Spanish energy companies, coupled with 
comparatively weak political oversight, lack of competition, and a focus on global markets 
left little space for consumer advocacy or environmental policy.82  Throughout the late 1990s, 
Spanish customers had some of the highest electricity prices in all of Europe, and most 
consumers generally believed that such high prices reflected a pro-industry bias that allowed 
large cash flows to be funneled into the international expansion of Spanish firms.  The 
consequence has been a deterioration of energy security in almost every metric.  Spanish 
energy intensity increased from 1990 to 2000 by 5 percent while European intensity 
decreased by 10.4 percent.83  The Spanish economy continues to be highly dependent on 
high-carbon fossil fuels such as oil and coal, which accounted for roughly 60 percent of 
energy use in 2007, and the situation is further compounded by the mismatch between state, 
territorial, and national energy policy, which has been very sporadic and irregular, with some 
regions aggressively pursuing renewables such as wind and solar while other regions have 
little penetration of renewable power supplies. 
 
4. Conclusions   
 Contemporary notions of energy security are indeed diffuse.  Our analysis of more 
than 90 academic articles on the topic revealed many dimensions, from the security of supply 
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and the affordability of energy services to the efficiency of economic output and the well 
being of humans and the natural environment.  While its multidimensional nature does create 
challenges for measurement and evaluation, energy security is too important a concept to be 
incoherently defined and poorly measured.  In response, we have created an Energy Security 
Index, utilizing ten metrics that encompass economic, social, political, and environmental 
aspects of energy security, and analyzed the status of energy conditions in 22 OECD 
countries from 1970 to 2007.  At least four interconnected conclusions can be drawn from our 
exercise.     
First, our Energy Security Index shows that a majority of countries analyzed have 
regressed in terms of their energy security.  This conclusion is discouraging, especially 
considering that the oil shocks of 1973 and 1974 culminated in the establishment of the 
International Energy Agency, the creation of strategic petroleum reserves among its 
members, and the diversification of the fuel base for electricity as most countries moved 
away from their use of oil to produce electricity.  In the United States, the crisis forced 
sweeping energy legislation through Congress, resulted in the establishment of the 
Department of Energy, and even provoked President Jimmy Carter to cite the energy 
challenge as “the moral equivalent of war.” Since those times, the international community 
has seen advances in low-income energy services, efficiency and demand reduction 
programs, renewable resources initiatives, and market restructuring of the various energy 
industries. Many individual states in Europe and the United States have implemented 
aggressive renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, and systems benefits funds, started 
emissions trading schemes, and invested heavily in alternative fuels such as hydrogen, 
ethanol and biodiesel.  Despite all of this effort, our Index reveals that most countries have 
backslid in their efforts to improve energy security.   
Second, despite the near universal deterioration of energy security, a great disparity 
exists between countries.  Some clear leaders, such as Denmark and Japan, stand above the 
rest, and offer many lessons.  Neither country left improving energy security to the 
marketplace, and their experience underscores the importance of government intervention 
through a progression of energy policy mechanisms.  First came energy taxes, standards, and 
R&D, followed by mechanisms such as tariffs and quotas, demonstrating the necessity of 
using a variety of mechanisms at once to promote sound energy policy.  The Danish strategy 
has promoted “triple diversification:” reliance on not just one type of technology, renewables, 
but also energy efficiency as well as combined heat and power and district heating to meet 
energy needs; not just one type of policy mechanism but a combination of taxes, subsidies, 
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tariffs, and standards; and not just one type of renewable energy but a combination of 
biomass, wind, and biogas digestion.  Diversification in all three forms—combining supply- 
and demand-side measures, utilizing a variety of policy mechanisms, and promoting a broad 
assortment of different types of renewable technologies—is essential.  No one approach, no 
one technology, and no one policy is sufficient alone.  Perhaps equally important, the 
overarching explanation for the success of Danish and Japanese energy policy lies in 
coordinated and consistent political support and policy.  Unlike the United States and Spain, 
where lack of synchronization between state and federal policy, constant changes in 
authorization and appropriations, a focus on other priorities, and expiration of programs has 
impeded energy policy, Japan and Denmark stand as testaments to the importance of 
consistency.   
Third, notwithstanding the progress made by Japan and Denmark (as well as Belgium 
and the United Kingdom), no nation scored perfectly.  This is because efforts to promote 
energy security, even for the most successful nations, have tended to focus on energy 
efficiency or increased supply to meet consumer behavior.  Strategies have involved 
increasing the energy efficiency of buildings, appliances, industrial operations, and vehicles, 
but not on changing consumer patterns, encouraging them to drive less, buy fewer vehicles, 
or own fewer appliances.  Virtually none of the countries examined tax urban sprawl, heavily 
promote mass transit and limited personal vehicle ownership, attempted to change consumer 
awareness, provided feedback on energy consumption in the form of real time prices, or 
changed underlying values by encouraging people to value nature, community involvement, 
and conservation.84 Thus, no country has successfully promoted true availability and 
affordability alongside efficiency and stewardship.  Tradeoffs have often been involved 
between them, and most countries have seemingly pursued one or two of the criteria at the 
expense of the others. 
 Fourth and finally, the relative success of Denmark and Japan and the relative failure 
of the United States and Spain serve as an important reminder that creating energy security is 
as much a matter of policy from within as it is from without.  Policymakers need not focus 
only on geopolitical power structures in energy resource producing states or draft new 
contracts with Nigeria and Russia for oil and gas supply. It is not sufficient to build trade 
alliances and share intellectual property, send more troops to Iraq or Saudi Arabia, or bolster 
naval deployments throughout the world’s shipping lanes.  Equally effective and important 
can be coordinated and robust domestic energy policy aimed at changing consumer behavior, 
promoting energy efficiency, and lowering greenhouse gas emissions.  Tools such as R&D 
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expenditures, subsidies, tariffs, and standards can be just as important, possibly more, for 
achieving available, affordable, efficient, and responsible forms of energy supply and use.   
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